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Abstract—With the needs of science and business, data sharing
and re-use has become an intensive activity for various areas. In
many cases, governance imposes rules concerning data use, but
there is no existing computational technique to help data-users
comply with such rules. We argue that intelligent systems can be
used to improve the situation, by recording provenance records
during processing, encoding the rules and performing reasoning.
We present our initial work, designing formal models for data
rules and flow rules and the reasoning system, as the first step
towards helping data providers and data users sustain productive
relationships.
Index Terms—data governance, data-usage rules, policy mod-
elling, rule formalisation, compliance reasoning, provenance
I. INTRODUCTION
Data ethics and privacy are of rising importance, especially
with the establishment of GDPR [1]. Similar issues also apply
in research when data from various sources are used as inputs
to analyses and simulations. Researchers are aware that there
are governance rules applied to the data, but they can easily
lose track of the rules when the number of sources becomes
large. The large volume of rules brings problem from three
aspects:
1) to fully read and understand the rules;
2) to consider the consequence of combining data and their
associate rules;
3) to assign rules to output so that results can be used
compliantly.
One response is to make data open and freely accessible
(e.g. under the FAIR principle [2] and/or as Linked Open
Data as suggested by Tim Berners-Lee [3]). This sounds nice
but it still leaves rules, for example to properly acknowledge
sources and to protect personal and commercially sensitive
data, even within collaborating communities [4]. Moreover,
this doesn’t solve (or even decrease) the prevalent polarization:
data are either completely public (with one or a few well-
known commonly agreed governance rules) or completely
under control with heterogeneous (yet potentially similar)
governance rules written in different languages, similar to the
situation for copyright licenses.
This work has been accepted and should appear in the Proceedings of IEEE
eScience 2019 Conference (BC2DC). Please cite the published work instead
of this one when possible.
This issue becomes more serious when IoT devices (es-
pecially sensors) are widely used: data from them can be
more sensitive, but users have limited control over where the
data will go [5][6]. Therefore, it is necessary to let intelligent
systems handle this as much as possible, while still getting
people involved and ensuring they understand what is needed.
We propose to pioneer a combination of technology and its
modes of use to help providers and users of data communicate
precisely about the rules. We also set out to enable computer
systems aid in compliance with rules while processing data.
This would use automation to draw attention to rules at the rel-
evant moments and collect information to support compliance
with the rules. This requires that the notations are sufficiently
machine readable and detailed to support the automation, and
can be directly or indirectly (through automatic conversion)
authored, understood and used by humans.
There are three approaches possible:
1) to police the system excessively taking little account
of semantic details in order to prohibit every possible
violation. This often excludes valid activities.
2) interpret the users’ actions and inputs to verify in detail
that rules will be honored. This is beyond the state of the
art when users have the full power of the system.
3) encode the rules taking the semantics into account,
and annotate the processing where necessary to perform
reasoning. This requires extra work for both the data
providers and the process developers.
Our work focuses on the third category which requires solu-
tions to three issues:
1) How to write the governance rules in a computer-
interpretable language?
2) How to handle the compliance checking?
3) How to ensure that malevolent actors cannot circumvent
the rules?
Our work deals with the first two aspects, while the third is
future work as it involves security and protection (for which
research like [7] may be applied). In addition, the fact that the
data processing is done by different bodies makes the problem
inherently federated, so the solution should also be federated.
Therefore, the solution needs to be:
1) vendor- and technology-agnostic;
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2) able to extend easily to different disciplines;
3) interoperable across institutional and even national
boundaries; and
4) not rely on a single trust authority.
These requirements direct our research to associate rules with
data, rather than use a central system to control data access.
A method to describe the effect of the processing steps on
rules is also needed, in order to decide which rules need to be
propagated or revised for the outputs. Therefore the solution
includes the following:
1) encoding procedure a procedure to transform natural
language governance rules to a formal representation;
2) rule language a computer-interpretable, extensible
and interoperable formal language to write the data-
governance rules;
3) rule association a standard protocol to associate en-
coded governance rules with the data;
4) data flow representation a vendor- and technology-
agnostic method to represent and record data flow;
5) flow behavior a mechanism to allow processes to
change the propagated governance rules;
6) reasoning system a reasoning system capable of work-
ing with any data-flow topology;
7) correctness verification a mechanism (or several
mechanisms) to ensure or verify that all the steps above
are conducted correctly.
Specifically, targets 2, 5 and 6 are the main aspects that our
work and standardized provenance is used as the data-flow
representation.
The structure of this paper is as follows: section II in-
troduces the related research; section III describes the rule
language we propose and provides some examples; section
IV describes the design and architecture of our system, and
presents initial results; section V highlights the contribution
of our work and introduces the future work. A conclusion is
drawn in section VI.
II. RELATED RESEARCH
Here we describe the related research, stating its relation
with the different aspects of our targets, as well as the
limitations of each approach. It is worth noting that much
research uses the word “policy” instead of “rule”, and the part
of the rules they capture lies mainly in controlling access.
A (now deprecated) standard called Platform for Privacy
Preferences (P3P) was established by W3C in 2002, aimed at
allowing websites to specify their privacy policies and compare
those against user’s preference to grant or prevent access (from
the user’s agent, e.g. web browsers). However, P3P had a very
limited vocabulary and was not widely implemented in web
browsers. It was finally deprecated and no successive standards
were established.
Building on some concepts from P3P, E-P3P (Platform for
Enterprise Privacy Practices) [8], one of the earliest works
we found. It attempted to address the expressivity issue in a
“formal” way by describing the privacy policy by specifying
permitted data users, purposes and operations, and specifying
consequent obligations. However, the set of predicates was
very limited and the work payed no attention to the federated
context, especially the interoperability issue. Checking com-
pliance with policies associated with data was not completed
there. It was reported in [9]; often cited as the foundation of
the sticky policy.
Sticky policy [9][10] provided a conceptual framework to
associate policies with data and “ensure” the data handlers
(people, institutions, etc) are aware of the policies, by encrypt-
ing the data first, sending the policies with the encrypted data
and sending the decryption key after checking that they agreed
to comply with the rules. However, the checking procedure is
not automatic and relies on the so-called Trusted Authority
(some agencies explicitly trusted by the data owner). That
said, in principle, the encrypt-and-decrypt concept can be used
as the foundation of the protocol for an automated checking
mechanism on each occasion and at each site he data is used.
CamFlow [11] is the work most similar to ours, though there
is still much difference. It uses (Decentralized) Information
Flow Control (IFC) [12] to represent the rules in the form of
tags (in two groups, secrecy and integrity), which is a very
simplified notation: compatibility of tags of the data and the
process are checked before processing. On the other hand,
CamFlow captures the importance of associating rules with
data and allowing processes to change the associated rules
(by specifying the modification to the output tags for each
process), though it did not show any work in handling multi-
input-multi-output processes. Moreover, CamFlow provides
a mechanism to handle the data flowing between machines,
making it possible to be used in a decentralized context.
Meta-code [13] is similar to CamFlow, and this technology
is used in a series of works ([14]–[16]). They also use the IFC
concept to assign permission tags (semantically, roles) to data,
and then specify the flow behaviour (by specifying the policy
file of output data) on the governance rule side (instead of the
process specification side, like in CamFlow). In addition, they
have a special meta-code part which is basically a program
(resulting in either pass or error) executed at any specific file
processing action (e.g. onAccess). However, because this is
an arbitrary program, the policy of the resulting data can only
be known at runtime, making it hard to do static analysis.
Thoth [17] on the other hand, favors the rule specification
purely from the data originator side, because of its context:
local data usage (search engine is used as an example). They
have a set of logical connectives and predicates to specify the
read, update and declassify policies. They do not use role tags
like CamFlow and Meta-code do, but they allow the use of
cryptographic keys (e.g. sKeyIs(x)) or IP addresses (e.g.
sIpIs(x)) to identify data users and allow a special loop
structure to test the match (existence). A further work, SHAI
([18]), provides a method to do static analysis for part of the
rule language of Thoth. Despite the expressiviness, the fact
that everything is based on the rules assigned by the data
originators either requires them to be “omniscient” or prohibits
many data uses that should be valid in principal.
Legal modelling is a whole different field, where precisely
modelling the document is the priority. [19] and [20] uses
reified predicate logic with Input/Output logic to model the
legal corpus into their logical representation (e.g. GDPR1).
[1] and [21] both looked at adding additional information to
provenance to check the compliance of execution processes
(against GDPR). However, these all focused purely on the
modelling of terms, and never considered that the data will
change (and so the rules will change) during processing.
There are also research and standards aimed at providing
languages to express policies, with no binding to any pro-
cessing systems, such as MPEG-212, XACML3 and ODRL4.
However, every one of them aims at expressing the policy
for “the (specific) data”, paying very limited attention (if any)
to the policy for “derived data”. From our perspective, Open
Digital Rights Language (ODRL) is the one most closely
related to our work. It provides an extensible semantic way
to describe permissions, prohibitions and obligations as well
as more fine-grained constraints. But because of its design
priorities, data are explicitly specified and no mechanism is
provided to support policy change, which means it does not
directly meet our requirements. On the other hand, since
ODRL provides its vocabulary in which many concepts are
defined almost the same as ours, we will reuse some of its
definitions in our language in the future.
III. RULE LANGUAGE
Having compared the related research and described the
general context, the requirements of the governance rule
language are set as follows:
1) be precise enough (i.e. have no ambiguity);
2) be able to talk about more than just access controls;
3) be interoperable across institutional (and jurisdictional)
boundaries.
Another language is also presented to model the flow behav-
iors, due to the necessity of referring to the governance rules.
We call this the flow rule (language), and call the modelled
governance rules data rule. As the name shows, the data rule
is bound to the data, while the flow rule describes the process,
as shown in Fig. 1.
In the following part, we first introduce our differentiation
of “obligation and obligation definition”; the motivation and
design of the data rule and flow rule languages are described
below; the last subsection presents encoding examples.
A. Obligation and obligation definition
An underlying concern across our work is the differentia-
tion between “obligation” and “obligation definition”. This is
introduced here to avoid confusion.
1dapreco, LegalRuleML formulae of deontic rules in the DAPRECO
project.: Dapreco/daprecokb https://github.com/dapreco
2ISO/IEC TR 21000-1:2004 https://www.iso.org/standard/40611.html
3eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) Version 3.0
https://docs.oasis-open.org/xacml/3.0/xacml-3.0-core-spec-os-en.html
4ODRL Information Model 2.2 https://www.w3.org/TR/odrl-
model/#policy-agreement
Figure 1: Annotation targets of data rules and flow rules
An “obligation” is an action that an agent (often a human)
should perform. It can be bound to the agent, a piece of data,
etc. It is an action that must be performed (otherwise it will
be a violation).
On the other hand, an “obligation definition” specifies “what
obligation will be activated under what situation”. It is not an
“obligation” itself, but describes how an obligation will be
created.
Therefore, a key difference is that “obligation definitions”
flow with data, while “obligations” may be “global” infor-
mation. In fact, the current language only supports global5
obligations.
To keep it short, this paper generally doesn’t distinguish
between these two terminologies when no confusion can be
made. When necessary, we use “obligated action” to described
“obligation”.
B. Data rule
The data rule describes the governance rules of a dataset.
It should capture the different aspects that a governance rule
may talk about.
A large aspect missed in most of the reviewed related
work is obligation. Examples include “the third column of
the dataset contains IP addresses, and should not be leaked
to the outside” and “due to funding concerns, use of our data
should be reported back to us”.
As shown in the examples above, the ability to describe
“obligation” is important to model governance rules. Having
this mechanism, we can mimic other types of rules (e.g.
privacy control).
In our work, the concept of obligation is borrowed from
[22]: the action that the data processor (normally human) needs
to do. Specifically, the post obligations and privacy policies
are the main focus of the current work.
In the original model, the obligation in [22] can contain an
identifier, a subject (or a role) who the obligation is related to,
an action which should be executed (i.e. the obligation), an
object on which the obligation acts on, an activation context
(condition) and a violation context (condition).
5“Global” in the session (see section III-B5).
Our model extends their model and makes adjustments to
provide more freedom in writing the obligations and remove
the unnecessary parts. In our work, the identifier need not be
supplied (it is automatically generated), because the activated
obligations will be stored as a list; the object is a part of
the specification of the obligation; the violation context is not
implemented at this stage. The subject of the obligation is
considered as the data processor (assumed to be the person
who started the session), so its specification only defines who
the obligation may apply to (like a filter) and it can be merged
into the activation context6. Therefore, the aspects that the
obligation definition will need to talk about are:
• obligated action the action that the data processor
needs to do when this obligation is activated;
• validity binding the data7 dependency affecting the
obligation definition;
• activation condition the condition that triggers the
obligation.
The obligated action in our model contains both the action
and object in the previous model, with more freedom to add
additional information; the validity binding is a new concept
in our model, specifically designed for the data-flow oriented
point of view; the activation condition is almost the same
concept as the activation context, with the addition of subject
as a condition. In addition, to have a better syntax, attribute
is introduced mainly to facilitate validity binding when used
in flow rules (see III-C). They are all explained below.
1) Obligated action: To facilitate reuse and interoperability,
we propose the obligated action to be an instantiation8 of a
class defined in an ontology. The arguments used to instantiate
will also be specified in the data rule, using the attribute
mechanism.
2) Validity binding: The validity binding is the data (or the
part of the data) that this obligation applies to, and defaults to
the whole dataset. If present, it refers to an attribute, and the
meaning is: “this obligation definition is in force if and only
if that specific attribute exists”.
3) Activation condition: This element specifies the con-
dition on which the obligation will be activated. Activated
obligations will be handled separately (stored into a list, in the
current implementation), but the obligation definition remains.
Ideally, users should check the list of activated obligations after
processing and conduct the activated obligations.
4) Attribute: Attributes are the extra information in the
data rule, like variables in programming. They can be used
(referenced) by the obligated action and the validity bind-
ing. An attribute contains a) an identifier (or id for short);
b) a value struct. The identifier is an IRI (Internationalized
Resource Identifier) and can be referenced (from obligated
6The working context requires a user identification at the start of session.
User who initiated action, such as running a specific workflow, is then the
subject. This is recorded in the provenance and can be easily used.
7The “data” here is actually attribute (as described in the latter parts).
8The correct word should be “individual”. But we use “instantiation” and
“instance” to mean they comply with the OWL axioms defined in the class
and only exist / make sense in the context of our system.
action and validity binding; the value struct is a struct (as in
programming). In fact, there may be multiple attributes with
the same identifier, so they will be merged into an ordered set
of value structs, and be referenced with index.
5) Session: Session determines the checking scope of some
activation conditions. For example, the :OnImport activation
condition is true only when the rule appears in an initial
component (see IV-B).
In the current implementation, session is handled very
naively: one provenance graph is considered as one session.
Normally, one execution of a workflow (in a workflow execu-
tion system supporting provenance) generates one provenance
graph, so we can also say one workflow execution is one
session. In practice, users run many workflows per sessions
but sometimes re-attach a new session to a running workflow.
This complexity is not relevant here.
C. Flow rule
Flow rules describe how the data rules propagate through a
process in a data-flow graph. Therefore, the flow rules of all
processes describe how the data rules of the data-flow graph
inputs propagate to the outputs.
The flow rule of a process should reflect the important
aspects of the actual data processing. For example, which
outputs are related to which inputs, what data transformation
has been done, etc.
The flow rule consists of two parts:
• port mappings;
• refinements.
The port mappings are the general behavior of how the data
rules flow from inputs to outputs. They come in the form
of input-output mappings (such as (inputN, outputM)), and
should be interpreted as “every data rule from input N goes
to output M (but may be refined)”. The default mapping is
“every data rule from every input port goes to every output
port”.
The (data) rule at the output may emerge modified to reflect
processing. The modifications act on the attributes, and can
be either delete or edit. The reason why add is not allowed
at the moment is because attributes take effect only when
referenced in obligations (so adding an dangling attribute
makes no sense)9.
The refinements need to specify the attributes they apply
to. If the targeted attribute does not exist, this refinement
simply passes without doing anything.
A delete refinement can either act on all attributes with a
specified id, or a particular attribute with a specified value
struct. On the other hand, an edit refinement can only act on
an attribute with a specified id and a specified value struct,
and it needs to specify a new value struct as the new value.
Both delete and edit should specify which output port they
9Generally, an obligation (definition) is atomic but carries modifiable
attributes. If the processing adds a significant new requirement that is shown
by including a new obligation on an output. This is beyond the design of
modifying attributes.
are acting on and (optionally) which input port the attribute is
from.
With these mechanisms, it is possible to capture some useful
information that would otherwise not be possible. For example,
the 3rd column of input 2 is placed at the 5th column in
output 1. Moreover, if a consecutive process removes column
5, we can now conclude the original 3rd column is removed in
the output of the second process. This is especially useful if
the original 3rd column contains sensitive information. Fig. 2
demonstrates this example.
After the refinement, merging is conducted. The very basic
intuition for merging is: it is possible that rules from different
input ports go to the same output port and these rules may con-
tain the same obligated action class or the same attribute id
(for various meaningful reasons, such as they were originally
from the same dataset). Therefore, the objective of merging is
to remove redundant rules and match attribute references.
Merging is essentially the merge of sets (the obligation set
and the attribute set) between two (or more) resources. But
because the obligation set contains references to the attribute
set, it may need to be slightly altered. It executes as follows
(see Algorithm 1 for a pseudo-code description):
1) for all attributes with the same id, remove redundancy
and redirect the references (in the obligations) to the
corresponding remaining attributes;
2) for all obligations, remove the obligations that are the
same (i.e. having the same action, validity binding and
activation condition)10;
3) return the remaining attributes and obligations.
Algorithm 1 Merging algorithm (for each output port)
Require: rs is the list of rulesets (of data rules) to be merged
1: o ← empty ruleset
2: for r in rs do
3: add all in r.obs to o.obs
4: for attr in r.attrs do {attributes}
5: if attr in o.attrs then {both the same id and value}
6: new attr ref ← reference to attr in o.attrs
7: for all ob in o.obs such that ob references attr do
8: update reference of attr to new attr ref
9: if ob has duplicates then
10: remove ob from o.obs
11: end if
12: end for
13: else
14: add attr to o.attrs
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: return o
10The equality is in the ontology sense: the whole IRI (including the
namespace) should match. A more extended solution should take ontological
reasoning into account (especially the owl:sameAs axiom), because two
different bodies may use different ontologies and parameters to express the
same concept.
D. Encoding examples
In this section, we demonstrate the encoding examples
of some governance rules as obligations, including the two
example rules given at the beginning of III-B.
For simplicity, we omit the ontology prefixes (namespaces).
In fact, they are not used for special purposes (except for
identifier) for this paper11.
1) Keep third column secret: For the rule “the third column
of the dataset contains IP addresses, and should not be leaked
to the outside”, the key information is that the specific column
should be kept secret, so this can be encoded as:
Obligation(:secret :col3, :col3, )
Attribute(:col3, :column 3)
Here, :secret and :column are two ontology classes. We
omit the prefixes (namespaces) but we keep the : to indicate
this should be an ontological reference. The :col3 is the id
of an individual as a result of the Attribute() statement12.
The Attribute() statement defines an attribute, with id :
col3, and value :column 3. This id is the individual IRI, so
it can be referenced in the Obligation() statement13.
The Obligation() statement contains three elements, sepa-
rated by comma. The first element is the obligated action and
the form :secret :col3 means an instance of the ontological
class :secret, and the argument is the (dereferenced) value
of (the attribute) :col3 (i.e. :column 3 initially). The second
element is the validity binding, bound to the (same) :col3
attribute. The third element is the activation condition, but
is empty for this obligation.
An empty activation condition means this obligation will
never be activated. As a consequence, we use this as a special
case meaning the related information should be checked after
processing (e.g. check all output data to see if any of them
have the :secret obligation). A better syntax may be used as
a future work.
2) Report data use: The stem of the rule “due to funding
concerns, use of the data should be reported back to us” is
actually “use of the data should be reported back to us”, so
this can be encoded as:
Obligation(:report :source, :source, :OnImport)
Attribute(:source, "Fictional source")
The :OnImport is the activation condition of this obliga-
tion, meaning this obligation will be activated when the data
is first introduced to the execution session.
Specifically, our rule language enables the data provider to
be explicit about what they mean by “use”. The example above
defines “use” as “the first time as input to the workflow”. An
11In the experiment, we developed a very primitive ontology. The ontology
to use in a production system is still under development to provide better
interoperability. The ontology to describe internal structures of data is external
to our research.
12From the computational point of view, it is automatically created in the
system.
13In fact, this attribute id doesn’t have to be in the ontology world because
it is not persistent. However, to make the syntax explicitly show this is not a
value, we keep the : here and describe it as an individual for simplicity.
Figure 2: An example demonstrating the use of flow rules: here they show adaption of the data rule with the column number
change. Ellipse for processes; cylinder for data; note-shape for rules; green for data without sensitivity; red for data with
sensitivity; the flow rules here follow the default propagation (i.e. everything in to everything out).
alternative definition could be “every time it is sent as an input
to a component”:
Obligation(:report :source, :source, :OnAsInput)
Attribute(:source, "Fictional source")
3) Acknowledge when publish: A common rule used in
research is “if you use our dataset and make a publication
based on it, you should acknowledge this in your publication
using a proper way such as ‘XX’”. This could be encoded as:
Obligation(:acknowledge :form, , :OnPublish)
Attribute(:form, "XX")
The :OnPublish condition matches a component which is
identified as making a publication. This component is actually
a “virtual” component, meaning it is not a component in
the provenance (of the executed workflow), but an additional
element added to the provenance at runtime to assist the
reasoning.
IV. SYSTEM
Facing the research questions and taking lessons from exist-
ing research, our system provides a mechanism to model more
than the access control aspect of the data governance rules in a
federated context, using the rule language described in section
III. In this section, we describe the system architecture (Fig.
3) and the design concerns.
A. Architecture
Since the system intends to provide a vendor- and
technology-agnostic method to deal with rules, the founda-
tion must have the same neutrality. The foundation contains
two parts: a) data-flow representation; and b) rule encoding
language. The rule languages are already described in section
III. Hence, this section mainly describes the data-flow repre-
sentation.
The data-flow representation is the main input to our system
(plus the encoded rules). Therefore, we choose provenance
Figure 3: System architecture
W3C PROV [23] to be the representation, taking the advan-
tage that PROV-O builds on OWL [24] which allows the
interoperability between different institutions by technologies
like ontology matching. In fact, as mentioned above, our rule
language also uses ontology for interoperability.
Specifically, we use S-Prov [25], an ontology extending
W3C PROV-O to record data-streaming workflow executions,
as the provenance specification. The reason we choose this
ontology is because a) it provides necessary information to
identify workflow components; b) our architecture is data–
centric which aligns with the data-streaming perspective of
S-Prov. However, the data-streaming feature is not used in our
system for the moment, so in principle our system can also
take other ontologies (e.g. OPMW14) as the input, either by
directly having a separated parser or using ontology matching
from the other representation to S-Prov.
Thus, our system uses the provenance to reconstruct the
data flow and identify relevant information (e.g. the agent
who initiated the execution), as the information necessary for
reasoning (e.g. in the activation condition of data rules).
Because our usage context is to help researchers comply
with the rules, there is no need to “enforce” the rules in the
14OPMW-PROV: The Open Provenance Model for Workflows
http://www.opmw.org/index.html
system. Instead, a method such as a prompt is considered
enough for the user (i.e. researcher) either as a reminder or
a checklist. For example, a user can ask what obligations he
has pending.
Therefore, the reasoning engine takes both the information
from provenance and the rules as input to reason about:
1) the governance rules of the output data at each stage; and
2) the activated obligations.
These two missions are essentially the reason why we
design these two sets of rules – they can be expressed as:
1) conduct the flow rules;
2) check the activation conditions of data rules (and instan-
tiate the activated obligations).
B. Implementation details
Because the rule languages are not yet expressed in logic,
we are unable to use formal reasoners (theorem provers, for
example). Instead, we developed a computational reasoning
system as proof-of-concept to demonstrate the feasibility of
this reasoning since the semantics of the rule languages are
clear.
The system takes the provenance as the input and then
extracts the data flow to construct a directed graph – vertices
are the processing steps (components) and the edges are the
data transmission between components. SPARQL is used for
this procedure, and the extra information like the component
function is kept in the resulting graph. The flow rules are
also inserted into the resulting graph.
After obtaining the graph, the reasoning can be conducted
for every node with 0 in-degree and then repeatedly for the
rest of the graph with 0 in-degree. This is essentially the same
as doing a topological sorting based on the in-degrees and then
performing reasoning from the beginning to the end.
For every component, the reasoning does the following:
1) Receive the data rules for every input port;
2) Identify the current context of execution and check the
activation conditions of every data rule; If any activation
condition is met, instantiate and store the activated obli-
gation;
3) Propagate the data rules from the inputs to outputs in
accordance with the flow rules.
In our implementation, the data rules are stored as an
augmentation to the graph extracted from provenance, directly
attached to the output ports. The reason why they are not
attached to data is because S-Prov schema aims at the data-
streaming style processing, so data are split into small chunks
and therefore data is produced and transmitted from an output
to an input incrementally. We assume that the governing rules
are the same for every data unit in the stream.
Specifically, the data rules for the initial components
(i.e. components that do not take any inputs) are imported.
We use the so-called recognizer to identify what rules shall
be imported by these components, and assign a fake input
with these rules. In a real production system, this should be
replaced by a more sophisticated way, but it is enough for the
proof-of-concept.
Table I: Pattern coverage of each synthetic workflow
Graph 1-1 1-n n-1 n-m
single line streaming X
spreading X X
collecting X X
redispatching X X X
C. Initial results
We conducted a few experiments to verify the system’s
correctness and the model’s feasibility.
We assume the data flow graphs are always fully connected
Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) with dangling input and
output ports / edges (which are directed connected to input and
output data). Therefore, the components are the vertices of the
graph, the data-flow connections are the edges. The potential
topology of DAGs is defined by its vertices and edges, and
the type of vertices (in terms of edges) is finite, so we only
need to ensure the correctness of our system for every one of
these vertices (components):
1) one-input-one-output (1-1), to test the propagation;
2) one-input-multi-output (1-n), to test spreading;
3) multi-input-one-output (n-1), to test the aggregation;
4) multi-input-multi-output (n-m), to test redispatching.
In principle, in a DAG, a vertex can have zero inputs or zero
outputs. Let aside the ones with dangling edges, semantically,
a component with zero inputs is a producer: it does not rely on
external resource, but will produce data (e.g. a prime number
generator); a component with zero outputs makes no sense in
a data flow (we argue a “storage” component also produces
outputs) so we do not consider it at all. For experimental
purposes, we use producers with one output port as the initial
vertices, and connect the reset of the graph to them.
The synthetic workflows are written in dispel4py [26], a
data-streaming workflow execution system. We executed these
workflows with provenance generation (coupled with S-
ProvFlow [25]), and then conducted reasoning. The reasoning
intends to check that the propagation works correctly, so
placeholders (simple strings) are used instead of meaningful
data rules.
The vertex patterns checked by each synthetic workflow are
shown in Table I. As a particular example, Fig. 4 demonstrates
the structure of the original synthetic workflow of redispatch-
ing, and Fig. 5 shows the reasoning result.
The success of these experiments demonstrates the cor-
rectness of our system and model. It also demonstrates the
feasibility of trying to handle data governance rules in any
DAGs.
V. CONTRIBUTION AND FUTURE WORK
We describe the contribution of this paper and the future
work in this section.
A. Contribution
The main contribution of this paper lies in five aspects:
Figure 4: Topology of the “redispatching” synthetic workflow. Squares are components; ovals are ports; arrows are
connections.
(a) left-half
(b) right-half
Figure 5: Reasoning result based on the provenance from executing the “redispatching” workflow (Fig. 4). Due to its width,
the figure is split into two halves (sharing Component_Redispatch2_MULTI_TO_MULTI): subfigure (a) is the left-half;
(b) is the right-half. In addition to Fig. 4: note-shapes are rules; lines (without arrows) connect the ports and the corresponding
rules; black triangle arrows indicate imported rules; egg-shapes indicate virtual port; components are greyed.
• clarified the questions concerning automating data-
governance rules handling and identified the research
targets in details in the federated context;
• demonstrated the use of provenance data as a source for
rules;
• extended and refined the obligation model in [22] to better
represent data-flow oriented data governance rule (policy)
specification and the federated context;
• developed a method to describe the flow behavior of the
rules for each process in a multi-input-multi-output data
flow graph;
• pioneered a systematic method to help researchers com-
ply with data governance rules in a federated research
community.
B. Future work
Since we are addressing a field which has received little
attention, there is a lot of research needed. This lies in three
directions:
1) Ground the rule languages into logic;
2) Extend the language to capture more aspects;
3) Develop supporting technologies.
The following part describes these directions in more detail
with our emphases. It’s worth noting that these three direc-
tions interact. Specifically, explicit encoding of requirements
(mentioned in section III) is related both to directions 2 and 3
(explained below): making the semantics explicit and provid-
ing a specific syntax in direction 2; providing the mechanism
to check in direction 3.
1) Logic grounding: This direction will be our main focus
in the next step, because a) we can become more certain that
there is no internal problem with the rule language; b) existing
formal reasoners can be used, taking the advantage of their
proven correctness; c) the rules from different sources can be
compared by checking their logical conflicts, enabling more
use cases.
The data rules and flow rules shall be grounded into
two logic sets, because of their different properties. For any
formalisation, the data rules should always be harmonious
with OWL because ontology (and therefore OWL) is critical
to interoperability. Similarly, because our framework builds
on top of semantic technology, the modelling mechanism
provided by OWL axioms is also worth exploring to encode
and validate flow rules.
2) Language extension: This direction is also important and
will be our secondary target. More fine-granulated semantic
meanings can be encoded with an extended language. This
should better be conducted with direction 1.
One item of future work may be to extend the activation
condition to accept more triggers; another potential item
is to add more language semantics, such as capturing and
denoting the violation context, or making session customisable.
In the meantime, ODRL may be a candidate to encode some
elements of data rules (e.g. obligated action).
3) Supporting technologies: This direction concerns the
collaboration and system implementation scenario, and gen-
erally would be conducted with other researchers from appli-
cation contexts. For example, our collaborator in KNMI will
bring useful use cases for our framework supporting earth-
system consortia.
An explicit direction may be to define a standard protocol
to retrieve rules with data; real-time processing (instead of the
current retrospective analysis) should also be investigated. This
would enable alerts to be sent to users when new obligations
emerge and eventually lead to warnings preventing serious rule
infringement, exploiting active provenance [27].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have identified a requirement for improving
rule management to help users and providers work well
together in a federated context. We proposed a method to
help by delivering appropriate encoding and automation. This
includes a formal model to encode the data governance rules,
and a companion model to describe how the governance rules
will flow and change during processing. We then presented
some example encodings of governance rules using our model,
and presented our proof-of-concept system as well as its initial
results to demonstrate feasibility. Finally, we highlighted our
contribution as a conceptual and practical framework.
We believe our work points to an important research direc-
tion, and provides a good first step towards solving that. More
work will follow, as described in the future work section.
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